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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Michael Anthony Loya, Jr., appeals from his conviction and sentence for 
battery on a law enforcement officer. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 At the time of trial, Officer Justin Cyr was a law enforcement officer for 11 
years.  (Tr., p. 165, L. 2 – p. 166, L. 2.)  He worked at the Twin Falls Police 
Department for four years, and before that had worked in the Twin Falls County 
Jail as a detention deputy for three years.  (Tr., p. 165, Ls. 19-22.)   
On November 4, 2015, dressed in his police uniform, Officer Cyr went to 
La Fiesta Mexican restaurant regarding a report of burglary and possession of 
stolen property.  (Tr., p. 176, Ls. 2-24.)  His investigation led him from La Fiesta 
to a home in Twin Falls.  (Tr., p. 180, L. 21 – p. 182, L. 1.)  The home owner 
granted Officer Cyr permission to enter and search for stolen property.  (Tr., p. 
182, Ls. 2-17.)  When Officer Cyr unlocked a door and went into a bathroom 
under the stairs he found Loya, sitting in the dark.  (Tr., p. 188, L. 9 – p. 190, L. 
23; p. 191, L. 11 – p. 193, L. 6.) 
Officer Cyr knew there was an active warrant for Loya’s arrest.  (Tr., p. 
193, L. 11 – p. 194, L. 12.)  He asked Loya if Loya recognized him from the jail, 
and Loya indicated he did.  (Tr., p. 194, Ls. 13-18; State’s Exhibit 1, at 4:10-
4:37.)  Officer Cyr asked Loya to take his hands out of his pockets.  (Tr., p. 194, 
Ls. 19-25.)  Instead Loya punched Officer Cyr in the face with a closed fist and 
then continued to punch him in the head area.  (Tr., p. 195, Ls. 1-7; p. 201, L. 4 – 
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p. 202, L. 1.)  Eventually Officer Cyr was able to subdue Loya and take him into 
custody.  (Tr., p. 201, L. 24 – p. 209, L. 17.)  A detention officer at the jail located 
contraband in Loya’s possession.  (Tr., p. 251, L. 19 – p. 255, L. 20.)  The state 
charged Loya with battery on a law enforcement officer and possession of 
methamphetamine.  (R., pp. 36-37, 93-94.)   
The state moved for an in limine ruling on the admissibility of evidence 
that Officer Cyr asked Loya “‘do you remember me from the jail?’” and “‘you have 
a warrant, don't ya?’”  (R., p. 65.)  The state proffered the evidence to show that 
Officer Cyr and Loya “knew each other through prior law enforcement contact 
and that there was an outstanding warrant to be served on the defendant on the 
date of this crime.”  (R., p. 65.)  The state addressed both relevance and the 
potential for unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403 and 404(b).  (R., pp. 65-69; Supp. 
Tr., p. 6, L. 25 – p. 9, L. 23.)  Loya’s trial counsel responded by arguing that 
although there was “some danger” of unfair prejudice in admitting evidence that 
Officer Cyr asked Loya if he remembered him from the jail,  
as long as the state doesn't focus extensively or more than that on 
the defendant's past jail history, which is extensive, I think that 
undue prejudice that they will infer he was guilty in this case 
because of his status as being a frequent flyer so-to-speak back, 
back in the day is hopefully mitigated. 
 
(Supp. Tr., p. 10, Ls. 17-24.)  The district court ruled that it would “allow the fact 
that the defendant was aware of this officer from prior experience in the jail so 
long as that is not overly emphasized or punctuated.”  (Supp. Tr., p. 13, Ls. 7-21; 
see also R., pp. 107-08.)   
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 The case proceeded to trial, at the close of which the jury convicted Loya 
on both counts.  (R., p. 157.)  The district court imposed consecutive sentences 
of five years with three years determinate for battery on a law enforcement officer 
and seven years with six months determinate for possession of 
methamphetamine.  (R., pp. 185-86.)  The district court also denied Loya’s 
motion for reduction of sentence.  (R., pp. 198-201.)  Loya timely appealed from 
the judgment.  (R., pp. 183, 190.) 





 Loya states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the State violate Mr. Loya’s right to a fair trial by 
committing multiple acts of prosecutorial misconduct which 
appealed to the jury’s passions and prejudices?  
 
2. Did the district court err in allowing reference to Mr. Loya’s 
past incarceration despite the fact that such evidence was 
more prejudicial than probative?  
 
3. Did the district court err by incorrectly instructing the jury on 
the elements of battery on a law enforcement officer?  
 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence?  
 
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Loya’s Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Loya failed to show fundamental error in the prosecutor’s comments 
during voir dire? 
 
2. Has Loya failed to show fundamental error in the prosecutor’s closing 
argument? 
 
3. Has Loya failed to show that he objected to admission of the part of the 
recording of his encounter with Officer Cyr where Officer Cyr asked him if 
he remembered him from the jail? 
 
4. Has Loya failed to show that the district court committed fundamental error 
by utilizing the language of the battery on certain personnel statute in jury 
instructions, except altering it to past tense? 
 








Loya Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s Comments 




 During voir dire the prosecutor asked whether potential jurors would “start 
off police officers on the same level as everybody else before they testified and 
listen to what they had to say before you decided whether to believe them.”  (Tr., 
p. 64, Ls. 10-13.)  She premised this question on the statement that “everybody 
knows that police get experience and training through their official duties, which 
can sometimes increase their reliability as witnesses.”  (Tr., p. 64, Ls. 1-7.)  The 
potential jurors answered that they would not treat officer testimony differently 
than other testimony.  (Tr., p. 64, L. 10 – p. 66, L. 3.)   
Defense counsel, in specific response to the prosecutor’s questions based 
on training and experience, asked jurors if they would find officers less credible “if 
they are accustomed to lying to suspects, telling them there's evidence that 
doesn't really exist, so they can get a confession” or “because they deal with bad 
people all day long, so then they become a little bit bad themselves to deal with 
that.”  (Tr., p. 114, L. 20 – p. 115, L. 6.)   
For the first time on appeal Loya objects to the prosecutor’s comments in 
voir dire, asserting they are fundamental error.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-15.)  






B. Standard Of Review 
 
“[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.”  State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009).  If a defendant fails to 
timely object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor, 
the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing 
by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental 
error.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010).  To show 
fundamental error:  
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
 
Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted).   
 
C. Loya Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, In The 
Prosecutor’s Inquiry During Voir Dire 
 
 It is “well-established that great latitude is allowed during voir dire 
questioning.”  State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 369, 313 P.3d 1, 25 (2013) 
(internal quotes omitted).  “[T]he right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is 
fundamental to both the U.S. Constitution and the Idaho Constitution.”  State v. 
Lankford, ___ Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ___, 35617, 2016 WL 4010851, at *2 (Idaho 
July 25, 2016).  An impartial jury is one without actual or implied bias.  Id.   
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 In addition, “[a]ttempts by the prosecutor to secure a verdict on any factor 
other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted 
during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that 
evidence impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial; 
therefore, such is reviewable as fundamental error.”  State v. Beeks, 159 Idaho 
223, 228, 358 P.3d 784, 789 (Ct. App. 2015) (internal quote and ellipses 
omitted).  However, “not every trial error or infirmity which might call for 
application of supervisory powers correspondingly constitutes a failure to observe 
that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.”  Donnelly v. 
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974) (internal quotation omitted).  “To 
constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of 
sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial.”  
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987).  To expand due process analysis to 
every objectionable argument by a prosecutor “leaves virtually meaningless the 
distinction between ordinary trial error of a prosecutor and that sort of egregious 
misconduct held in [Supreme Court precedent] to amount to a denial of 
constitutional due process.”  Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 647-48. 
 It was certainly proper to address whether potential jurors would treat 
testimony from law enforcement officers differently than from other witnesses.  If 
the prosecutor phrased that inquiry in a manner that was objectionable, such was 
“ordinary trial error” rather than the “egregious misconduct” forbidden by due 
process.  Loya has failed to show clear or obvious constitutional error. 
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 Likewise, Loya has failed to show clear or obvious constitutional error 
because the record shows his attorney, rather than object, specifically referenced 
and responded to the prosecutor’s inquiry regarding officers’ reliability as 
witnesses and inquired whether potential jurors would find them less reliable 
because they sometimes lied in the course of their investigations and possibly 
became bad because they addressed bad things so often.  Loya has failed, on 
this record, to show that the lack of objection was not tactical. 
 Finally, Loya has failed to demonstrate prejudice.  The prosecutor 
specifically asked if jurors would treat officer testimony differently and none 
responded that they would (and several responded that they would not).  
Defense counsel likewise addressed the issue and found no potential juror who 
would treat officer testimony differently than other witness’s testimony.  
Moreover, the state’s case relied only marginally on the reliability of officers as 
witnesses because its evidence included a damning recording of Loya’s attack 
on Officer Cyr (State’s Exhibit 1), photographs of Officer Cyr’s injuries (State’s 
Exhibits 2-6), and physical evidence of Loya’s possession of methamphetamine 
(State’s Exhibits 7, 8).  This record reveals no reason to believe that the trial was 
rendered unfair by the prosecutor’s voir dire.  
 
II. 





 While arguing that “the victim [was] engaged in the performance of his 
duties,” I.C. § 18-915(3)(b), the prosecutor stated: 
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Officer Justin Cyr has worked in law enforcement for a number of 
years. It takes a special person to continue to do this job in today's 
anti-law enforcement climate. And on November 4th of 2015, that's 
what he was doing. He was doing his job, ferreting out crime in our 
little town, following up on a report about a stolen couple of TVs at 
somebody's house. 
 
(Tr., p. 299, L. 18 – p. 300, L.  1.)  The prosecutor also stated that Officer Cyr 
was doing his job “nicely.”  (Tr., p. 300, L. 25 – p. 301, L. 3.)  Loya did not object 
to the prosecutor’s argument. 
 For the first time on appeal, Loya claims that these arguments constitute 
prosecutorial misconduct.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-15.)  Specifically, he argues 
that they were “an attempt to invoke sympathy” for the victim.  (Appellant’s brief, 
p. 11.)  Loya has failed to show error, much less fundamental error. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
To show fundamental error Loya must demonstrate from the record a 
constitutional error; that the error is clear or obvious and that the lack of an 
objection was not tactical; and that the error affected the outcome of the trial.  
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.   
 
C. Loya Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, In The 
Prosecutor’s Closing Argument 
 
 To be a due process violation the error must affect the fundamental 
fairness essential to the very concept of justice.  Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 642.  To 
rise to the level of a due process violation, prosecutorial misconduct must be 
“egregious” and not “ordinary trial error.”  Id. at 647-48.  Arguments that are 
“somewhat inflammatory because they were likely designed to appeal to the 
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sympathies and passions of the jury” do not “rise to the level of fundamental 
error.”  Severson, 147 Idaho at 719, 215 P.3d at 439 (prosecutor’s argument that 
the victim was “speaking from her grave” not fundamental error). 
 In this case the prosecutor’s comments are not even “somewhat 
inflammatory,” much less a due process violation.  The argument that Officer Cyr 
was performing his job “nicely” was merely a comment on the evidence.  State’s 
Exhibit 1 shows that the prosecutor could have added that Officer Cyr was doing 
his job “politely” and “competently.”  Likewise, the comment that it takes a 
“special person” to continue working in law enforcement “in today's anti-law 
enforcement climate” is not inflammatory, and even if it were it would only be 
“somewhat inflammatory,” not a violation of due process.  It is certainly less 
inflammatory than claiming the victim was speaking from her grave.  Loya has 
failed to show a due process violation, much less one that is clear or obvious.   
Loya has also failed to show that the lack of an objection was not tactical.  
This case involved an attack on and battery of a law enforcement officer doing 
his duty.  The jury was certainly aware of these basic facts.  Likewise, the jury 
was most likely aware that the job of a law enforcement officer is often difficult 
and dangerous.  Even if defense counsel had objected, and even if the objection 
had been sustained, the net gain would have been minimal at best, and may 
even have been a net loss in terms of jury appeal. 
Finally, Loya has shown no prejudice.  The prosecutor’s comments, if at 
all inflammatory, were so minimally inflammatory in the face of the overwhelming 
evidence that Loya in fact battered Officer Cyr (the only contrary evidence Loya 
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claims is that Officer Cyr did not orally identify himself as a police officer as he 
stood before Loya in his uniform (Appellant’s brief, p. 14)) that there is no chance 
of prejudice.   
 Loya additionally argues that his claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
should be addressed cumulatively.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.)  Under the 
doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in themselves, may 
in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.  State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 
445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994).  A necessary predicate to application of the 
cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error.  State v. Hawkins, 
131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). In addition, cumulative error 
analysis does not include errors not objected to unless those errors are found to 
be fundamental.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982.  Because Loya has 
failed to show that either of his claims of prosecutorial misconduct are 
fundamental error, he has failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine is 
applicable to his case. 
 
III. 
Loya Has Failed To Show That He Objected To Admission Of The Part Of The 
Recording Of His Encounter With Officer Cyr Where Officer Cyr Asked Loya If 




The state moved for an in limine ruling on the admissibility of evidence 
that Officer Cyr asked Loya “‘do you remember me from the jail?’” and “‘you have 
a warrant, don't ya?’”  (R., p. 65.)  The state specifically stated that it was not 
seeking to introduce evidence regarding “any facts regarding the defendant's 
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prior Incarceration.”  (Id.)  Loya’s trial counsel responded there was “some 
danger” of unfair prejudice in admitting evidence that Officer Cyr asked Loya if he 
remembered him from the jail, but 
as long as the state doesn't focus extensively or more than that on 
the defendant's past jail history, which is extensive, I think that 
undue prejudice that they will infer he was guilty in this case 
because of his status as being a frequent flyer so-to-speak back, 
back in the day is hopefully mitigated. 
 
(Supp. Tr., p. 10, Ls. 17-24.)  The district court ruled that it would “allow the fact 
that the defendant was aware of this officer from prior experience in the jail so 
long as that is not overly emphasized or punctuated.”  (Supp. Tr., p. 13, Ls. 7-21; 
see also R., pp. 107-08.)   
 Loya claims the district court erred because evidence that Loya knew 
Officer Cyr was a law enforcement officer through his dealings with Officer Cyr in 
the jail was “only minimally relevant” and was “far more prejudicial than 
probative.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.)  The crux of Loya’s argument is that the 
“from the jail” part of the evidence could have been eliminated without “impairing 
the substance” of the evidence.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 16, n.3; see also p. 18 (“It 
was not necessary for the State to establish where Mr. Loya had previously seen 
Officer Cyr.”).)  This argument fails for two reasons.  First, it was not preserved.  
Second, removing the context that Loya knew Officer Cyr “from the jail” would 
have removed the evidence’s probative value of showing that Loya knew Officer 





B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law reviewed de novo.   
State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993) 
(citations omitted).  However, the abuse of discretion standard applies to the 
district court’s determination that the probative value of the evidence is not 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.  State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 
205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009). 
 
C. Loya’s Claim That The Court Should Have Ordered The Redaction Of The 
“From The Jail” Part Of Officer Cyr’s Question Is Not Preserved For 
Appellate Review 
 
 “It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal. 
If not raised below, the objection may not be considered for the first time on 
appeal.”  State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000).  
As set forth above, the state wished to offer evidence that, upon encountering 
Loya, Officer Cyr asked Loya if he remembered him “‘from the jail’” and Loya 
indicated he did, without getting into any details about why Loya would have 
known the officer “from the jail.”  (R., p. 65.)  Loya’s trial attorney acknowledged 
that the evidence was relevant, that the state was “likely entitled” to admit the 
evidence “regardless of our objection to that point,” and that its potential unfair 
prejudice would be “mitigated” if the state “doesn't focus extensively or more than 
that on the defendant's past jail history, which is extensive.”  (Supp. Tr., p. 10, Ls. 
5-24.)  The district court began its ruling by stating it was ruling “on the 
stipulation,” ruled on both the warrant issue and the knowledge from jail issue, 
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and did not mention an objection until reaching the third issue of Loya’s 
comments about Officer Cyr after the arrest.  (Supp. Tr., p. 13, L. 7 – p. 14, L. 
13.)  From this record, it appears that the district court accepted a stipulation that 
the evidence on the recording of the encounter was admissible, but that the state 
could not get into Loya’s history or the reasons for why he would know Officer 
Cyr “from the jail.” 
 Even if Loya’s counsel did not stipulate to the evidence, at no point did he 
ask the court to redact the recording to eliminate the “from the jail” part of Officer 
Cyr’s question.  (Supp. Tr., p. 9, L. 25 – p. 11, L. 19.)  Because Loya did not 
request redaction of the “from the jail” language from the exhibit in the trial court, 
his appellate claim that it was error to not redact the “from the jail” language from 
the recording is not preserved. 
 Even if preserved, Loya has failed to show error.  Evidence may be 
excluded if its potential for “unfair prejudice” substantially outweighs its probative 
value.  I.R.E. 403.  “Unfair prejudice” is the tendency to suggest a decision on an 
improper basis.  State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010).  
One of the elements the state had to prove was that Loya, at the time of the 
battery, “knows or reasonably should know” that Officer Cyr was a peace officer.  
I.C. § 18-915(3)(b).  Evidence that Loya knew Officer Cyr “from the jail,” where 
Officer Cyr previously worked as a sheriff’s deputy, was highly probative of 
Loya’s knowledge while the possibility of unfair prejudice was minimal. This 
evidence was well within the district court’s discretion to admit. 
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 Loya argues it “was not necessary for the State to establish where Mr. 
Loya had previously seen Officer Cyr,” and therefore the context of Loya’s 
knowledge “had no probative value” and “was only minimally relevant.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 18.)  The fallacy of this argument is demonstrated from a 
simple thought experiment.  What if, instead of asking, “Do you remember me 
from the jail?” Officer Cyr had asked, “Do you remember me from high school?”  
The context is what makes Loya’s acknowledgement of knowing Officer Cyr 
extremely probative and shows no abuse of discretion in weighing that against 
any potential for prejudice.1 
 
IV. 
Loya Has Failed To Show That The District Court Committed Fundamental Error 
By Utilizing The Language Of The Battery On Certain Personnel Statute In Jury 




 The battery on certain personnel statute provides, in relevant part, that 
one of the elements of the crime is that the “person committing the offense 
knows or reasonably should know that such victim is a peace officer.”  I.C. § 18-
915(3)(b).  The district court in this case provided a jury instruction that stated 
this element as “MICHAEL ANTHONY LOYA, JR. knew or reasonably should 
have known that Justin Cyr was a police officer.”  (R., p. 145.) 
                                            
1 The state also submits that the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented at trial 
shows that even if admission of the evidence was error that error was harmless. 
“The [harmless error] inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational 
jury would have convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the 
challenged evidence.”  State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 
(2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)); see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 
P.3d 961, 979 (2010).   
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 For the first time on appeal, Loya contends the language of this element 
constituted fundamental error.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 19-24.)  Because the 
challenged language of the instruction merely converts the statutory language 
(“reasonably should know”) to past tense (“reasonably should have known”), 
Loya’s argument is without merit.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
To show fundamental error Loya must demonstrate from the record a 
constitutional error; that the error is clear or obvious and that the lack of an 
objection was not tactical; and that the error affected the outcome of the trial.  
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.   
 
C. Loya’s Claim That Converting The Statutory Language To Past Tense In 
The Instruction Was Fundamental Error Is Without Merit 
 
 As stated above, the relevant statutory language is “reasonably should 
know.”  I.C. § 18-915(3)(b) (emphasis added).  The challenged language in the 
instruction was “reasonably should have known.”  (R., p. 145 (language altered 
from statute italicized).)  It was, of course, necessary to change the present tense 
used in the statute to past tense in the instruction because Loya’s knowledge at 
the time of the crime, not at the time of trial, was what the jury had to find.  Other 
present tense language in the statute was also converted to past tense.  
(Compare I.C. § 18-915(3) with R., p. 145 (changing “committing” to “committed,” 
“is” to “was,” and “knows” to “knew”).)  Loya’s claim of fundamental error, when 
the only change in the instruction from the applicable statute was to convert the 









 The district court imposed consecutive sentences of five years with three 
years determinate for battery on a law enforcement officer and seven years with 
six months determinate for possession of methamphetamine and denied Loya’s 
motion to reduce those sentences.  (R., pp. 185-86, 198-201.)  Loya contends 
the district court abused its discretion in its sentencing and the denial of his 
motion for leniency.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 24-28.)  Review shows those claims to 
be without merit. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 In determining whether the sentencing court abused its 
discretion, this Court reviews all the facts and circumstances of the 
case.  To show an abuse of discretion, the defendant must show 
that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive, 
considering any view of the facts.  The governing criteria, or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for 
wrongdoing. 
 
State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, ___, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016) (internal cites and 
quotations omitted). 
 
C. The Sentence In This Case Was Reasonable 
 
 When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, the 
most fundamental requirement is reasonableness.  A sentence is 
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary 
objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the 
related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.  When 
reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, this Court conducts 
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an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the 
nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the 
protection of the public interest.  In deference to the trial judge, this 
Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where 
reasonable minds might differ.  Furthermore, a sentence fixed 
within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be 
considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
 
Id. (internal cites, brackets, and quotations omitted).  Application of these 
standards shows no abuse of discretion. 
 For battery on a law enforcement officer and possession of 
methamphetamine the district court imposed sentences totaling 12 years with 
three and one-half years determinate.  (R., pp. 185-86, 198-201.)  It reviewed the 
relevant sentencing materials and applied the correct legal standards.  (Tr., p. 
354, L. 22 – p. 355, L. 9.)  The district court specifically looked at Loya’s 
character, including his uncle’s opinion of him, and concluded that Loya was at 
that time “unsupervisable” on parole or probation.  (Tr., p. 356, L. 22 – p. 357, L. 
21.)  The district court concluded that, although giving Loya the maximum 
applicable sentences would be reasonable, it wished to give Loya the chance to 
change and merit supervision in the community, so it crafted the sentence to give 
the parole system a chance to make a determination at a later time.  (Tr., p. 357, 
L. 22 – p. 358, L. 24.)  This was despite the fact that Loya had not taken 
advantage of prior treatment opportunities provided by parole and the jail.  (Tr., p. 
358, L. 25 – p. 359, L. 7.)  The court took into consideration the fact that Loya 
committed the current crimes while on, but avoiding, community supervision.  
(Tr., p. 359, Ls. 8-13.)  The district court noted Loya’s “overall lack of remorse.”  
(Tr., p. 359, Ls. 14-16.)  The district court also denied a subsequent motion for 
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reduction of sentence.  (R., pp. 198-201.)  The factors specifically identified by 
the district court, plus the facts of the crimes and Loya’s terrible criminal history 
(PSI, pp. 5-12), all support the district court’s exercise of discretion. 
 Loya argues the district court “failed to consider” mitigating factors.  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 25.) Review, however, shows that the district court did not 
fail to consider the factors cited by Loya. Rather, the district court made factual 
findings with which Loya disagrees.  Loya, however, has failed to claim, much 
less demonstrate, that the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous.    
Loya contends the district court ignored his “supportive family,” specifically 
citing to his uncle’s testimony about his character.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 25.)  The 
district court, however, specifically addressed the uncle’s testimony about Loya’s 
character and rejected it because Loya’s “history is the opposite of that.”  (Tr., p. 
356, L. 22 – p. 357, L. 21.)  Loya cites his substance abuse and claims of 
willingness to undergo treatment (Appellant’s brief, pp. 25-26), but ignores the 
district court’s contrary factual findings (Tr., p. 359, Ls. 2-7) (noting that Loya had 
not “taken advantage of treatment opportunities”).  He points out that he 
expressed remorse (Appellant’s brief, p. 26) but ignores the district court’s finding 
of an “overall lack of remorse” (Tr., p. 359, Ls. 14-16).  Loya’s argument that the 
district court failed to consider mitigating facts is untrue; the district court 
considered Loya’s mitigation claims but found the facts against Loya.      
 Loya’s claims regarding denial of his Rule 35 motion are at least as 
frivolous.  He claims he submitted “additional information” with his motion, but 
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cites only to the motion itself.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 27-28.)  The motion contains 
only arguments by counsel.  (R., pp. 195-96.)  Loya’s argument is baseless.  
 Loya has failed to show any abuse of sentencing discretion.  The record 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction. 
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